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Case No. 20081015-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Daniel Larry,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of cocaine, a third degree
felony, and possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. This Court has
jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. On the basis of the law in effect at the time, did trial counsel render
ineffective assistance in not seeking to suppress the drug evidence, and did the trial
court commit plain error in not sua sponte suppressing it?
Standard of Review. " An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the
first time on appeal presents a question of law/7 State v. Perry, 2009 UT App 51, f 9,
204 P.3d 880 (quotation marks and case citation omitted). 'To prevail under plain

error review, a defendant must demonstrate that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome/' State v.
Ross, 2007 UT 89, % 17,174 P.3d 628 (quotation marks and case citation omitted).
2. Was Officer Francom justified in searching the vehicle incident to the
driver's arrest on the ground that the two unsecured passengers, including
Defendant, could gain access to the car and retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence?
3. Should the exclusionary rule apply here?
Standard of Review. These issues were not raised below; therefore, no standard
of review applies. However, this Court may affirm the trial court's admissibility
ruling "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record,
even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be
the basis of it ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is
not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower in court, and
was not considered or passed on by the lower court." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f
10, 52 P.3d 1158 (case citation and quotation omitted).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, house, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. Amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, a third degree felony, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2) (West 2004), and possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l)
(West 2004). R5-6. Defendant was convicted as charged following a one-day jury
trial. Rl06-07. The trial court imposed a zero-to-five-year prison term for the
felony, and 180-days jail for the misdemeanor. R119. Defendant timely appealed.
R121.

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 1
In the early morning hours of 27 May 2007, Officer Francom of the Ogden
City Police Department was patrolling in the area of Madison Avenue. R132:47-48.
He randomly entered "plate numbers on cars as [he] passed them or as they were in
front of [him]," looking for "stolen cars or cars without insurance." Id. at 48. Officer
Francom ran the plate number of a green Ford Contour and "[Realized it didn't
have insurance." Id. Officer Francom effected a traffic stop of the driver and two
passengers, including defendant, who was sitting in the backseat. Id. at 48-49.
Thereafter, the driver was arrested on an outstanding warrant. Id. at 49.
Officer Francom asked the passengers to step out of the vehicle so that he
could search it incident to the driver's arrest. Id.; see also id. at 62. As the passengers
stepped out of the vehicle, Officer Francom noticed a drug pipe "laying on the seat
directly below where [Defendant's] right leg would have been." Id. at 51-52.
Defendant was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. at 57.
Detective Grogan transported Defendant to jail. Id. at 64, 69. The Detective
searched Defendant and his patrol vehicle before placing Defendant in it. Id. at 68.
When Detective Grogan removed Defendant from the patrol vehicle, he "observed

1

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State
v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, % 2,114 P.3d 551.
4

two off-white rock-like substance[s] on [the] seat" that were later determined to be
crack cocaine. Id. at 69. A second search of Defendant's person revealed "a small
piece of burnt brillo pad in his left front coat pocket/7 with drug residue. Id. at 7173. In Detective Grogan's experience, the brillo pad was "typical of what you'll find
at the end of a crack pipe," as a filter. Id. at 72; see also id. at 73.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to
suppress the drug evidence and that the trial court committed plain error in not sua
sponte doing so. However, trial counsel's performance must be assessed in light of
the law in effect at the time of trial. Here, the law in effect did not support a
challenge to the search of the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest. Defendant cites
the United States Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. Gant,

U.S.

, 129 S.Ct.

1710 (2009), which severely limited an officer's authority to search a vehicle incident
to arrest.

But Gant was not decided until approximately six months after

Defendant's trial. Before Gant, searching the passenger compartment of a vehicle
incident to the driver's arrest, even where the arrestee was already secured, was a
lawful and accepted practice nationwide. Because neither trial counsel nor the trial
court could be expected to anticipate a change in the law, Defendant's claims of
ineffective assistance and plain error fail.
5

II. In any event, Gant does not prohibit the search of a vehicle incident to a
driver's arrest where, as here, there are unsecured passengers present. In Gant, a
case that did not involve any passengers, the Supreme Court held that officers may
search a vehicle incident to the driver's arrest only if the driver/arrestee is within
reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of the search, or the officer has reason to
believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.

These

justifications are not present in this case. Nevertheless, Officer Francom was
justified in searching the passenger compartment incident to the driver's arrest
because the unsecured passengers, including defendant, were within reaching
distance of the car.

Defendant's detention following the driver's arrest was

therefore lawful. Gant does not control the outcome.
III. Alternatively, the exclusionary rule does not apply here for two reasons:
first, the good faith exception applies when, as here, officers rely on nearly thirty
years of settled precedent that is subsequently invalidated, and second, Gant
constitutes a new rule of Fourth Amendment law whose suppression remedy
should not be applied retroactively.

6

ARGUMENT
I.
ON THE BASIS OF THE LAW IN EFFECT AT THE TIME, TRIAL
COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN NOT
SEEKING TO SUPPRESS THE DRUG EVIDENCE, AND THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN NOT SUA SPONTE
SUPPRESSING IT
In Arizona v. Gant,

U.S.

, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), the United States

Supreme Court held that police officers may search the passenger compartment of a
vehicle incident to the driver's arrest only when the arrestee is within reaching
distance of the vehicle, or there is reason to believe that the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest. Id. at 1719. Defendant raises claims of ineffective
assistance and plain error because trial counsel did not move to suppress the drug
evidence under Gant, and because the trial court did not do so sua sponte. See Aplt.
Br. at 13-14,16. However, Gant was not the law in effect at the time of Defendant's
trial. Thus, Defendant cannot prevail on either claim.
A,

Defendant has not, and cannot, show ineffective assistance.
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish both

prongs of the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, which holds that
such claims succeed only if the defendant shows: (1) that his counsel's performance
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) that counsel's

7

performance prejudiced the defendant. 466 U.S. 668,687-688 (1984); see also State v.
Strain, 885 P.2d 810,814 (Utah App. 1994). Thus, a defendant "raising an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim carries a 'heavy burden.'" Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036,
1046 (10th Cir. 2002). There is a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689. "This presumption derives from our common experience that attorneys, as a
whole, usually represent their clients in a professional, competent, and reasonable
manner." Bullock, 297 F.3d at 1046.
Failing to file a motion to suppress does not necessarily fall outside the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,
384 (1986) ("[W]e agree with petitioner's view that the failure to file a suppression
motion does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel."). Rather, "[t]o
establish a claim of ineffectiveness based on an oversight or misreading of law, a
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating why, on the basis of the law in effect at
the time of trial, his or her trial counsel's performance was deficient." State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201,1228 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added); accord Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510,523 (2003) (court must assess counsel's decisions from "counsel's perspective at
the time") (citation omitted); Bullock, 297 F.3d at 1052 ("[W]e have rejected
ineffective assistance claims where a defendant 'faults his former counsel not for
8

failing to find existing law, but for failing to predict future law' and have warned
'that clairvoyance is not a required attribute of effective representation/").
Counsel's failure "to make motions or objections [that] would be futile if raised does
not constitute ineffective assistance." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 34,989 P.2d 52
(quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, '"proof of ineffective assistance of
counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality/"
Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, If 36, 203 P.3d 976 (quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d
870, 877 (Utah 1993)).
Here, Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to
suppress the drug evidence on the ground that "counsel was apparently unaware of
the fact that police officers cannot search a vehicle after arresting the driver for a
non-violent offense." See Aplt. Br. at 9 (citing Arizona v. Gant,

U.S.

, 129 S.Ct.

1710 (2009)). However, Defendant "cites no authority in effect at the time of trial"
that would have supported a motion to suppress. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1228. Gant was
decided in April 2009, approximately six months after Defendant's October 2008
trial. SeeR132.
Before Gant, it was "widely accepted" that under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454 (1981), officers were authorized to search the passenger compartment of a
vehicle incident to the driver's arrest, regardless of whether the arrestee was
9

secured. Gant, \79 S.Ct. at 1722, n . l l ; see also Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615,
628 (2004) (Scalia, J., with Ginsburg, J., concurring) (observing "cases involving this
precise factual scenario — a motorist handcuffed and secured in the back of a squad
car when the search takes place — are legion"); Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
7.1(c), at 517, n.89 (4th ed. 2004 and Supp. 2008-2009) (collecting cases).

Utah

precedent pre-dating Gant was no exception. See, e.g., State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d
1196,1203 (Utah 1995) ("[A]ny full custodial arrest, even for a misdemeanor traffic
violation, allows an officer to conduct a highly intrusive search of the arrested
person,... and his or her vehicle, [Belton], 453 U.S. [at] 460"); State v. Kent, 665 P.2d
1317,1319 (Utah 1983) (Durham, J. concurring) (upholding, under Belton, vehicle
search conducted after Kent was arrested, secured with handcuffs, and ordered to
the ground near his vehicle); State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1248-49 (Utah App.
1996) (upholding vehicle search incident to Moreno's arrest after Moreno was
secured in patrol car, recognizing "[mjany other jurisdictions have upheld the
contemporaneous search of a vehicle incident to arrest after the defendant was
handcuffed and seated in a police car, and probably unable to access anything in
defendant's car").
Given the above, prevailing law at the time of Defendant's trial permitted a
vehicle search incident to the driver's arrest—whether or not the driver was
10

secured. It necessarily follows that passengers were thus lawfully detained until the
vehicle search was safely concluded. See Arizona v. Johnson, __ U.S.

, 129 S.Ct.

781, 788 (2009) (clarifying that passengers are reasonably detained incident to a
traffic stop "for the duration of the stop" or until "[officers] have no further need to
control the scene"). Thus, viewed, as it must be, from "counsel's perspective at the
time," Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523, the law in effect during Defendant's trial did not
support a challenge to the lawfulness of searching a vehicle incident to the driver's
arrest, and after the driver was secured. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1228. To the
contrary, such searches were the constitutional norm for nearly thirty years.
Therefore, any motion to suppress on that ground would have been futile. Whittle,
1999 UT 96, t 34.
In sum, Defendant has "failed to demonstrate that the law at the time of his
trial" would have supported a motion to suppress. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1228; Wiggins,
539 U.S. at 523. Trial counsel did not render constitutionally deficient performance
because he failed to divine that the Supreme Court would severely limit Belton. See
Bullock, 297 F.3d at 1052. Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance therefore fails.
B.

Defendant has not, and cannot, show plain error.
Defendant additionally claims that the trial court plainly erred in not sua

sponte suppressing the drug evidence. AplL Br. at 16. To establish plain error, a
11

defendant must show "that the trial court committed an error that was both obvious
and prejudicial/ 7 State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 24,122 P.3d 543. If either prong is
unmet, the other need not be addressed. See State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50,61 (Utah
1993). For the same reason that Defendant failed to show that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress, he fails to show that the trial court
committed plain error in not sua sponte suppressing the drug evidence. See State v.
Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App. 1994) (error that should have been "plain to
the court, should also have been plain to trial counsel"), vacated on oilier grounds, 925
P.2d 937 (Utah 1996).
As shown in Point LA, supra, the law in effect at the time of Defendant's trial
did not support a challenge to the lawfulness of the vehicle search. Indeed, Belton
was universally read to authorize a vehicle search even after the arrestee was
secured. Gant was not issued until six months after Defendant's trial. Before Gant,
no trial court would have sua sponte suppressed the drug evidence on the ground
that the vehicle search was unauthorized. Therefore, no error occurred here, let
alone an obvious and prejudicial error. See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah
1989) (rejecting a claim of plain error where a dispositive appellate case had not yet
been decided). Defendant's plain error claim may be rejected on either ground.
Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 24; Germonto, 868 P.2d at 61.
12

II.
OFFICERS WERE JUSTIFIED IN SEARCHING THE VEHICLE
INCIDENT TO THE DRIVER'S ARREST ON THE GROUND THAT
UNSECURED PASSENGERS, INCLUDING DEFENDANT, COULD
GAIN ACCESS TO THE CAR AND RETRIEVE A WEAPON OR
DESTROY EVIDENCE
As noted in Point I, supra, Defendant asserts only that Arizona v. Gant applies
here in the context of ineffectiveness and plain error. However, even if the Court
were to consider Gajit's application outside of the context of ineffectiveness and
plain error, Defendant still cannot prevail. This is because Gant does not prohibit
the search of a car incident to a driver's arrest where, as here, there are unsecured
passengers present.
Gant; which as noted in Point I, supra, was decided after the trial court ruled
here, held that officers may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident
to the driver's arrest only when the arrestee is within reaching distance of the car, or
there is reason to believe that it contains evidence of the offense of arrest. 129 S.Ct. at
1714 (limiting Belton, 453 U.S. 454). Here, the driver was arrested and secured
before Officer Francom attempted to search the passenger compartment.

See

Rl 32:49, 62, 64, 69, And Officer Francom had no reason to believe that the car
contained evidence of the driver's outstanding warrant. Had the driver been the
only occupant of the car, a vehicle search incident to arrest would not be justified

13

under Gant. However, the Gant rational does not apply where there are unsecured
passengers present.
Although Gant limits Belton, Gant does not limit Belton's application here,
because Gant is distinguishable on its facts. Unlike the instant case, Gant was the
sole occupant of his vehicle. See Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1715. Therefore, once Gant was
secured in the back of the patrol car, there was no danger he would reach into the
car to grab a weapon or destroy evidence. Id. at 1719. Here, however, the car had
three occupants: the driver and two passengers, one of whom was defendant.
R132:48-49. Only the driver was arrested. Id. at 49. As pointed out by Justice Alito,
"it is not uncommon for an officer to arrest some but not all of the occupants of a
vehicle/' Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1731, n.2 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J.,
Kennedy, J., & Breyer, J.). As further noted by Justice Alito, the Gant majority "does
not address the question whether in such a situation a search of the passenger
compartment may be justified on the ground that the occupants who are not
arrested could gain access to the car and retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence." Id.
Accordingly, Gant does not limit Belton s application where, as here, there is an
unsecured passenger. Indeed, an unsecured passenger presents the same danger as
an unsecured driver/arrestee, both of whom "could gain access to the car and
retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence," Id.
14

Arizona v. Johnson,
lawfulness

of Defendant's

U.S.

, 129 S.Ct. 781 (2009), further supports the

detention pending a search of the passenger

compartment. In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court clarified that passengers
are reasonably detained incident to a traffic stop "for the duration of the stop" or
until "[officers] have no further need to control the scene, and inform the driver and
passengers they are free to leave." 129 S.Ct. at 788 (citing Brendlin v. California, 551
U.S. 249,258 (2007)). As explained, Belton still applies when unsecured passengers
are present, even if the driver/arrestee is secured. It necessarily follows that the
officers had "further need to control the scene," or to detain Defendant until the
passenger compartment search could be safely concluded. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788.
Any other rule would unnecessarily jeopardize officer safety.

The Fourth

Amendment does not require this. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,110
(1977) (recognizing as "too plain for argument" that public interest in officer safety
is "both legitimate and weighty").
The Supreme Court's clear concern for officer safety during traffic stops,
expressed most recently in Johnson, is dispositive here. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized that ""[t]he risk of harm to both the police and the occupants
[of a stopped vehicle] is minimized, . . .

if the officers routinely exercise

unquestioned command of the situation."" Johnson, 129 S.Ct at 786 (quoting
15

Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (in turn quoting Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981)) and citing Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 258 (recognizing it is
"reasonable for passengers to expect that a police officer at the scene of a crime,
arrest, or investigation will not let people move around in ways that could
jeopardize his safety")).
Once an arrest is initiated, the risk to officer safety only increases. See United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973) ("[T]he danger to an officer is far
greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect
into custody and transporting him to the police station than in the case of the
relatively fleeting contact resulting from the typical Terry-type stop."); accord
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998). The increased potential for danger
encompasses passengers, who are "every bit" as motivated as an arrested driver, "to
employ violence to prevent apprehension of... a crime." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414; see
also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 373 (2003) (noting passengers "will often be
engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in
concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing" (case citation and
quotation marks omitted)).
The United States Supreme Court's concern for officer safety is not
unfounded. The most recent data reveals that in 2007,6,424 officers were assaulted
16

and eleven were killed during traffic pursuits or stops. See Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted,
Tables 1.9 & 68 (2007) (' Uni forn t. Crin te Repoi ts'' ) (fou nd at 1 ittp: " 1 ' v ' A/ \ v7,f bi.gov/
i lcr 'killed , 2007 ' data table 1 9, htm 1 k httpi - ' w w w.fbi.gov / uci - ""killer i '2007/
data/table _68.html). One of the murdered officers was killed while searching the
offender's vehicle.

See Uniform Crime Reports, Table 24 (found ai h t t p : / /

www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/

2007/data/tableJ24. html).

Utah law enforcement

officers are not immune from this danger. See Sara Israelsen-Hartley, Lehi Officer
shot: Police kill woman u in- ,•/• \\</ri; . J ^ e i v i \c\.~
Woman wounds a

J
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(copies of both articles are attached in the addendum).
Nevertheless, in an opinion pre-dating Arizona v. Johnson, this Court held that
"from the moment the driver was placed under arrest/' there was "no lawful reason
why the passengers were detained."' State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, *\] 1 [ 1 2 19,1 82
P3d935,cerf. £*.<.:;<<; K-° P V V7;L l^.2^V>\2

Bake/±\-y\S-jr±<\:

passengers <i/e

The Utah Supreme Court heard oral argument in Baker, and a certified
companion case dealing with the same passenger detention issue, State v. Gettling,
Case No. 20080037-SC, on 3 March 2009. The Supreme Court granted supplemental
briefing regarding Arizona v. Gant, in both Baker and Gettling, The State's motion for
supplemental oral argument in these cases is still pending.
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unreasonably detained once the driver is formally arrested, id. at f 12, can only
make an already dangerous situation more dangerous. Johnson makes plain that the
Fourth Amendment does not require this. 129 S.Ct. at 788. Therefore, to the extent
that Baker conflicts with the holding in Johnson, that passengers are lawfully
detained incident to a traffic stop until there is no "further need to control the
scene/' Baker has been effectively overruled. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 788.
In sum, because Defendant was one of two unsecured passengers, Gant does
not apply here and Officer Francom remained authorized under Belton and Johnson
to search the passenger compartment incident to the driver's arrest—regardless of
whether the driver/arrestee was secured. The trial court's ruling should therefore
be upheld.
III.
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOES NOT APPLY HERE
In any event, the exclusionary rule does not apply here for two reasons: first,
where, as here, officers rely on nearly thirty years of settled precedent that is
subsequently invalidated, the good faith exception applies, and second, the
exclusionary rule should not be applied retroactively in cases involving a clear
break from settled Fourth Amendment law.

18

"The Fourth Amendment protects '[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures/' but 'contains i 1.0 pro\ isioi i express!) precludii ig the use of e1 , idence

D.et. o^5, 699 (2009) Muc-ire Arizona v. Evans, 514 US. i, lo (1995)).

The

exclusionary rule is a judicial creation "that, when applicable, forbids the use of
improperly obtained evidence at trial/ 7 Id. (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 398 (1914)).

The exclusionary rule is '"designed to safeguard ; . i.rih

Amendment rights g e n e r a l inroLMyUir i«^ie:T'..'.Lc-i: - :
Calandra, ;: l L .r* " ^

-.4^ . "•-•"-•.» -•';".>•",.•» — * .

. «,:;:: , .

,\... r'cdc** 0.

-,-•-• \—,.<.-. — .,-,* ,: ; . ^ ^

occurred — z.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable — does not necessarily mean
that the exclusionary rule applies/ 7 Id. at 700.
Because the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter officer misconduct,
the culpability of that conduct must be considered. ,,/. c;i e^-:":0 (citing United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. ^97, 923 n.4 (1984)); see also >r - ~ ]:

,o - . ^ i . . . ..: ,

,.e

applies only to flagra; •'. •-.* deliberate Fourth Amendment violations, or "only a re
can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be
charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional/ 7 Id. at 701 (quoting
Illinois v;krull, 480 U.S. 340,348-49(1987)). Indeed, exclusion is a "'last resort/" not
19

a "'first impulse/" Id. at 700 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586,591 (2006)).
Moreover, because the exclusionary rule is not an individual right, it is applied only
when it will effectively "deter[ ] Fourth Amendment violations in the future/' Id.
(citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-355; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,486 (1976)). Finally,
"the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs/ 7 Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at
910). The exclusionary rule should not therefore apply where it can provide only
"marginal" or "incremental" deterrence. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation
and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 368 (1998) and Krull, 480 U.S. at 352-53). This is
particularly true given the "'substantial societal costs'" of the rule, i.e., "letting
guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free —something that 'offends basic
concepts of the criminal justice system/" Id. at 700-01 (quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 35253 and Leon, 468 U.S. at 908).
A, The good faith exception applies when officers rely on settled
precedent that is subsequently invalidated.
Given the above, "[vjarious principles have been established to limit the
application of the exclusionary rule." United States v. McCane, No. 08-6235,2009 WL
2231658, at *4 (10th Cir. 28 July 2009) (citing Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 700.). "One such
principle is the good faith exception." Id. (citing Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 701). The crux
of the good faith inquiry is "'whether a reasonably well trained officer would have
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known that the search was illegal' in light of 'all the circumstances/" Herring, 129
S.Ct. at 703 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23).
Initially, the good faith exception to the e\.:\^wi\^:\

:-.:•.. .,: .-.J- . *

police reasonably ai id i n good faith relied upon a warrant subsequently declared
invalid " A icCane 2009 WL 2231658, :: - * (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). The good
faith exception has since been extended to "warrantless administrative searches
performed in good-faith reliance on a statute later declared unconstitutional," and
to officer reliance "on mistaken information in a court's database that an arrest
warrant was outstanding/' Hernug, i~- ^ L L U ;
ru f-i'.i.1/'^, 5'M V S . : : '
except. I ^
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enforcement employee." McCane, 2009 WL 2231658, at *5 (citing Herring, 129 S.Ct. at
704). The officer in Herring relied on an arrest warrant that was subsequently found
to have been recalled, but which recall did not appear in the computer database.
Herring, 129 S •. . -L •:-S

::U

^npiviiLe V.O..:L . A ^ U - ^ A M ^ , , I . p ... ; . .. ::L

Amendment violation occui red, but declined toappl> the exclusionary rule to what
was at most a negligent failure to act, rather than a deliberate or tactical choice to
act:

"[TJhis error is not enough by itself to require 'the extreme sanction of

exclusion,'" Id. at 700 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916).
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If the good faith exception applies to negligent officer conduct like that at
issue in Herring, it necessarily follows that it applies to non-culpable officer conduct
like that at issue here. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50 (applying good faith exception to
warrantless administrative search performed in reliance on statute later declared
unconstitutional). Indeed, as set out in Points I and II, supra, before Gant, it was
"widely accepted" that Belton authorized a search of the passenger compartment of
the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest, regardless of whether the arrestee was
secured. Where, as here, law enforcement officers were, at the time, authorized to
conduct a search of the passenger compartment incident to the driver's arrest, even
if the arrestee was secured, Officer Francom could not "'have known that the search
was illegal' in light of 'all the circumstances.'" Herring, 129 S.Ct, at 703 (quoting
Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23). To the contrary, given the circumstances at the time,
Officer Francom "did nothing improper." Id. at 700; see also McCane, 2009 WL
2231658, at *6 ("[A] police officer who undertakes a search in reasonable reliance
upon the settled case law of a United States Court of Appeals, even though the
search is later deemed invalid by Supreme Court decision, has not engaged in
misconduct."). Because there was no culpable conduct on the part of Officer
Francom when he acted here, "'the extreme sanction of exclusion'" is unjustified.
Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 700 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916). The good faith exception
22

applies. See NicCane, 2009 WL 2231658, at *6 (applying good faith exception to
vehicle search invalidated by Gant); see also United States v. Owens, No. 5:09-cr-14,
2009 \A / L 2584570 (I J.D. Fla. 20 Aug list 2(309) (same). ;
. B. Arizona v. Gant is a new rule of Fourth Amendment law whose
suppression remedy should not be applied retroactively.
Notwithstanding the above, Gant constitutes a clear break with Belton, or a
new rule of Fourth Amendment law that should not have retroactive application.
In asserting that Gant shouk; ne-L apply retroactively here, the State recognizes that
* .-. ''.c'-'ii.fV, 47-;' ". 7, 3:4 ; ! ° 0 , the United States Supreme Court did
awav wi:1*' the "'clear break' exo^-tit--- !•-. the general proposition that new rules
governing criminal procedures should be retroactive to cases pending on direct
review/' Id, at 326, 328. Under the clear break exception, "a new constitutional rule
was not applied retroactively, even to cases on direct review, if the new rule
explicitly overruled a past precedent of [the] Court, or disapproved a practice [the]
Cou rt had arguably sanctioned in prior cases, or *:\ - ;*; i \ :i u ,: £ » ; * •;":>>.a. • 7 i;"- ;; \-^ : i • •
that lower courts had uniformly approved/ 7

Id. at 325 (citing United States v.

Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982)).
In Griffith, the Supreme Court considered whether new rules regarding use of
peremptory challenges imposed in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), applied "to
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litigation pending on direct state or federal review or not yet final when Batson was
decided/' Griffith, 479 U.S. at 316. Although the new peremptory challenge rules
imposed in Batson constituted a clear break with Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965), the Supreme Court declined to except Batson from the general rule of
retroactive application, holding instead that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on
direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule
constitutes a 'clear break' with the past." Id. at 328. In so holding, the Supreme
Court emphasized that application of the clear break exception resulted 1) in casespecific analysis that was inappropriate when deciding whether a new rule applied
retroactively to cases pending on direct review, and 2) in the uneven administration
of justice, because similarly situated defendants end up being treated dissimilarly.
M a t 327.
Because Griffith was a jury selection case, however, the Supreme Court did not
there consider the ramifications of giving retroactive application to the exclusionary
rule for new rules of Fourth Amendment law. Where the remedy for a jury selection
violation is a new trial, see id. at 319, the remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation
is suppression, which, more often than not, is tantamount to dismissal. See Herring,
129 S.Ct. at 701 (observing that "[t]he principle cost of applying the [exclusionary]
24

rule is , . . letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free"). Such a price
is far too steep for a new rule of Fourth Amendment law.
.:.• rjj^vme L K ; ; ; //; dernng held that the exclusionary rule is not
appropriate unless "the benefits of deterrence

eu'^ei ^ 11 the vo^ts." LI. ul 700

Therefore, "[t]o trigger the exclusionary ri ile [officer] miscondi ict mi t st 1: e
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently
culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system/ 7 Id. at
702. Herring thus explained that the exclusionary rule should be applied "'only :f it
can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be
charged with knowledee *h.:' : . ; o : ^ ; . ; i ^ - v - y -i::^;..:.;.:* u.._.er me rourth
Amendment/" iu. (quoting Krutt, 480 : ^>: , t M * - ^

T
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met where, as here, the officer's conduct conformed to then-existing Fourth
Amendment law.
As shown in Points I-III. A, supra, Gant significantly limited Belton, a case that
law enforcement officers in Utah and nationwide reasonably relied on for nearly
thirty years. As further shown, the suppressi- -r. e vne> *\ ,w , .>.s \.. - u . t ; • — _ie A
Griffith, is an extreme sanction generally and even moiv -o V P P H :•••• ^!k«T
misconduct is involved. It necessarily follows that the Griffith retroactivity rule
should not be applied here.
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In sum, going forward, Gant instructs law enforcement officers as to the limits
of a vehicle search incident to a driver's arrest, and violations of Gant will be subject
to the exclusionary rule. But applying the exclusionary rule to officer conduct that
was lawful before Gant"overturned a longstanding practice that lower courts had
uniformly approved/7 Griffith, 479 U.S. at 325, can have only marginal or
incremental deterrent value, if any. Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 700. In light of Herring, the
Griffith retroactivity rule is not justified on these facts and should not therefore
apply here.
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CONCLUSION
I'oreguii^ :•. ^oi-- :' -J '.

/ : -*.•<.., „: affirm.
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Addendum

Deseret News
Lehi officer shot: Police kill woman who opened fire
By Sara IsraeiseivHarttey
Deseret News

LEHI — Lehi police officers and city officials are reeling from a shooting Monday morning that
sent a veteran police captain to the hospital and brought back memories of the last officer they
lost.
Just before 9 a.m., police Capt. Harold Terry pulled over a female driver suspected of being
impaired, after a gas-station clerk called 911 to report the woman had exhibited slurred speech
and poor balance.
After a short disagreement at the car window, the 34-year-old woman, who was still seated in
the car, suddenly fired twice with a .38-caliber revolver, hitting Terry twice in the left side of the
head, just above his ear. Terry was able to draw his gun and fire once into the car and back-up
officers on scene fired five rounds at the woman, killing her.
One bullet exited Terry's head and the other bullet and shrapnel were surgically removed late
Monday morning at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, where he was reported to be resting
in stable condition, surrounded by family and friends, said Lehi Police Sgt. Darren Paul.
"This is a trying time for all of us. We're all very close," Paul said, as he stood in front of the
police station that bears the name of the last officer they lost — Lt. Joseph Adams. Like Terry.
Adams had also stopped a suspected impaired driver when he was killed in August 2001.
The woman fatally shot Monday morning is from Washington state but was living in Provo arid
attending school in Utah County.
Police have not released her name pending notification of her family.
Officers cannot find any indication that the woman has a criminal record, nor do they believe
she was the subject of a warrant. They will be conducting an autopsy and toxicology reports
and searching her car to determine what may have caused her behavior, Paul said.
A combined group of investigators and officials from the Utah County Attorney's Office will be
reviewing the use of force by the Lehi officers.
"Traffic stops are considered the most dangerous encounters officers face," Paul said. "There
are so many unknowns,"
Terry had followed the proper protocol for the stop at 1000 E. Main, in front of a busy gas
station, Paul said.
"He's a veteran leader here," Paul said. "He's very well respected and professional in how he
carries out his duties."
Although police captains are often found in an office behind a desk, Terry was out on the road
and responded when he heard the dispatch report.

http://www.deseretnewsxom/art.irleyr,ontPTit/rnnhi1p/l ^6?n 7 n r m 7 / i m r\r\ ^ i o « « ^ u : . . . .

"Knowing Capt Terry, I'm not a bit surprised," Paul said "He leads by example "
Terry has been with Lehi for 16 years and was promoted in February to captain over the patrol
division, Paul said
As well as ieading by example, Terry also trained and taught officers
He had just finished teaching one term of law enforcement operations at Provo College, which
focuses on the day-to-day life of a police officer, said Ken Peay, program administrator for the
criminal justice degree at Provo College
"Harold was an excellent teacher," Peay said "He was really, really good with his students I
think he exemplifies the best of the best," Peay said.
Terry had taken the summer semester off but planned to come back in the fall, Peay said
"He loved it," Peay said "He was really good at it, you could tell how much he enjoyed it
because of his demeanor in the classroom
He made the classes come to life with his
experiences "
Several students have called wanting to send messages or flowers to the family, Peay said
One of the experiences Terry shared with students included being involved in a shoot-out with a
former police comrade, Art Henderson, who had chased his ex-wife and her boyfriend through a
residential Lehi neighborhood, firing several shots at them in January 2006
Lehi officers took Henderson down with several shots to the leg, and he was arrested
Henderson was later charged with numerous felonies, including attempted aggravated murder,
but his criminal case ended in April 2006 when he hanged himself in a cell at the Salt Lake
Metro Jail
"It's hard to think that these men and women put their lives on the line," said Lehi Mayor
Howard H Johnson, who stopped by the station to share his love and support with the force
Johnson, too, mentioned Adams when he talked about Monday's shooting The poignant
memory of the fallen officer is something no one has forgotten
In the August 2001 shooting, Adams found a bag of cocaine in a car he had pulled over, told
the driver he was under arrest and began to handcuff him Somehow the driver got one hand
free, grabbed a handgun from his belt and shot Adams
Although wounded in two places, Adams was able to return fire, hitting the man multiple times
With a handcuff dangling from one wrist, the shooter, Arturo Javier Scott Welch, got in his car
and drove away, according to Utah County Sheriffs officials He was captured by Salt Lake
County Sheriff's deputies at a gas station in Draper
Welch, 23, pleaded guilty to aggravated murder the following year and was sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole
At the time of that shooting, Adams a three-year member of the Lehi Police Department, was
married and had an 8-month-old son
In the aftermath of Monday's shooting, the task now is to support and pray for Terry and his
family, as well as the family in Washington that has lost a loved one the mayor said
"Right now we'll do the best we can, pray and hope the Lord sees fit to bless him extra,"
Johnson said

He extolled the police officers, saying that many people don't pick professions with inherent
risks or obstacles.
"But these good (officers) take a job that has them all," he said. "And they do it with a sense of
cheer and happiness. We live in debt to them every day."

E-mail: sisraelsen(d)desnews,com
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Woman wounds a cop, dies in a gunfight, police say
Nate Carlisle. The Salt Lake Tribune. Salt Lake City, Utah: Jun 24, 2008.
Abstract ( S u m m a r y )
The woman told the attendant she wanted to buy gas, said David Mayson, the station's manager, but then the woman
changed her mind as the attendant was in the midst of scanning her debit card. Video footage from the gas station
shows the woman walking to her tan Honda Accord and standing there "staring off into space," Mayson said.

Full T e x t (795 words)
(Copyright Salt Lake Tribune Jun 24, 2008)
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LEHI - Police Capt. Harold Terry has so much experience making traffic stops, he has trained officers in how to pull
over strangers and determine if they are dangerous.
But even that experience couldn't keep him out of harm's way Monday morning. Terry stopped a driver who, police
said, drew a pistol and shot him twice in the head.
Terry survived and is expected to recover, police said. Other officers arrived and shot and killed the 34-year-old
woman moments after she wounded Terry, creating a bloody scene on one of the town's busiest streets.
Lehi police on Monday said they do not know what provoked the woman. KUTV Channel 2 reported that police
confirmed the woman's name was Kelly Wark.
Sometime before 8:45 a.m., she arrived at a gas station on the corner of 850 East and Main Street. The woman told
the attendant she wanted to buy gas, said David Mayson, the station's manager, but then the woman changed her
mind as the attendant was in the midst of scanning her debit card. All the while the woman acted "distracted," Mayson
said.
Video footage from the gas station shows the woman walking to her tan Honda Accord and standing there "staring off
into space," Mayson said. She drove away after a minute or so and the attendant called police to report the woman
might be driving under the influence.
Terry, a 55-year-old who has worked for Lehi police for 16 years, heard the call over his radio and responded. Sgt.
Darren Paul said dispatcher records show Terry reported stopping the Accord at 8:52 a.m. near 1000 E. Main Street.
Paul said Terry read the Washington state license plate number on the Accord to dispatchers before approaching the
car.
Other Lehi officers who arrived to assist Terry with the stop saw him speak with the woman inside the car. The driver
was still seated in her car when the assisting officers saw and heard the woman fire two shots from a .38-caliber
revolver Paul said.
Both bullets struck Terry on the left side of the head, with at least one bullet striking above the ear and exiting behind
the ear, Paui said. The driver exited the car as the officers drew their weapons and ran toward her and Terry.
Two officers fired on the woman, Paul said. Terry also fired one shot but it struck the car; Paul said, The woman,
dressed in cargo pants and a dark shirt, died at the scene.
Terry communicated with medical personnel at the scene and later at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center. Paul said
Terry underwent at least one surgery Monday that removed bullet fragments. He was listed in stable condition
Monday.

"We are optimistic and hopeful for a full recovery," Paul said.
Along with having plenty of his own experience, Terry trained other officers from Lehi and around the state in how to
make traffic stops. The protocol includes specific ways to park behind the suspect's vehicle and how to walk upon
and interact with the driver. Paul said it appears all those protocols were followed Monday.
Paul declined to release personal details about Terry, except to say he is a Lehi native. Terry's former neighbor,
Tamara Bates, described Terry and his wife as a nice couple who worked in their yard and attended a local LDS ward
"Whenever I saw him he was smiling and teasing," Bates said. "He would always pull out policeman jokes."
ncarlisle@sltrib.com
Lehi shootings
Lehi, population 36,000, has seen its share of police shootings in recent years:
* In 2001, officer Joseph D. Adams tried to arrest a suspected drunken driver when the man drew a gun and killed
Adams.
* In 2006, two Lehi officers shot and wounded former Lehi police officer Art Henderson after Henderson shot and
wounded his estranged wife's boyfriend then began shooting at the officers.
Little information on the shooter
* Police on Monday released few details about the woman who shot police Capt. Harold Terry. She was described
only as a 34-year-old from Washington state who recently moved to Provo to attend school.
* Police said they could not find warrants for her arrest and were notifying her family of the events before disclosing
more information.
Credit: By Nate Carlisle The Salt Lake Tribune
[Illustration]
Caption: Crime scene investigators stand over the body of a woman who was involved in a shooting of a Lehi police officer
after a traffic stop in Lehi on Monday.; A Life Flight employee restocks supplies in the helicopter that brought Lehi police
Capt. Harold Terry to the emergency unit at the Utah Valley Medical Center in Provo on Monday.; A police officer comes to
visit a wounded colleague at the emergency unit at Utah Valley Medical Center in Provo on Monday.
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